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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALICE FARX\YORTH,
Plaintiff,
VS.

CHRIS JEXSEX, AL~[A .JENSEN
and S\\... EX ( ~. JENSEN,

Case No.
7378

Defendants.

Brief of Respondents
STATEl\fENTS OF FACTS
Defendants have examined the appellant's statement and accept as hereinafter specifically noted, said
statement is a fair and concise presentation of the facts
in this case.
On Page 4 of appellant's brief, first paragraph, appellant states: ''The defendants wholly failed to make or
tender the payment of the purchase price as specified in
the contract.'' With this assertion we take issue. Tender
1
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was made by the defendants in their answer to the first
suit filed June, 1938. See Exhibit "2", file in Case No.
2379. Tender was also made by the defendants of the
sum of $5,200.00, balance of principal plus interest at
6 per cent per annum on said balance from April1, 1948,
when the amount of outstanding liens and encumbrances
on the 263 acres had been determined, plus $656.30 with
interest thereon from May 15, 1939, at 6 per cent per
annum, plus $400.00 with interest thereon at 6 per cent
per annum from May 15, 1943, plus $598.37 with interest
from May 15, 1948, plus interest at 6 per cent per annum
on said sums from on or prior to l\Iay 1, 1949. This
tender still remains available to plaintiff when appellant tenders a warranty deed to defendants; hence, it
is manifest that the statement of the appellant charging
that the defendants have ,,·holly failed to make or tender
the purchase price is not supported by the facts. See
answer of the defendants dated November 20, 1948. True,
if appellant's contention of what the contract of the parties specifies is correct as a matter of law, then the
tender of the defendants fails to abide by the terms of the
contract, but the sole issue which now divides the litigants revolves about what the contract requires by way
of tender under all the facts and circumstances of the
case as set forth by the appellant, with which defendants
are .in agreement and accord except as herein set forth.
Appellant assigns five errors in the conclusions of
law and the decree of the court entered thereon. These
errors are all addressed and directed to the sole issue involved upon this appeal; namely, when under the terms
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and conditions of the contract and the conduct of the
appellant were the defendants obligated to pay or tender
the balance of the principal, to wit: the $5,200.001 Appellant insists that nothing in the conduct of the appellant relating to her efforts to c.lear the title of the bond
liens against the land in quesEon relieYed the defendants
of making the installment payments of principal as
specified in the contract. The trial court found the liens
to be in excess of the balance of principal specified in the
contract and concluded until the total amount of such
liens had been fixed and determined th~ defendants were
not called upon to make further payments of principal
or interest under their contract. Both parties remained
in possession of the respective properties exchanged
under the contract in the interim when appellant was
acting to clear the liens.
The appellant has considered all errors and treated
them together as one and the defendants have chosen to
do likewise for as stated above we see but a single point
involved, viz: were the defendants entitled under their
contract as a matter of law to suspend paYillents of principal and interest until appellant had legally determined
the total amount of the liens and encumbrances outstanding against the property~
ARGUMENT
We agree with counsel for appellant that no factual
dispute is presented by this appeal. At the outset appellant brushes aside the consideration of Exhibit '' 2''
(Tr. 87), to wit: the entire file in Case No. 2379, which
3
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represents litigation between these parties wherein
appellant sought to have the contract in question declared forfeited because defendants had paid nothing
thereon except the $300.00 paid November 10, 1936. Appellant asserts the decision of the trial Judge, Hon.
Lester A. Wade, now a member of this court, has no bearing whatever inthis case at this time. While this appeal
does not stem from the decision in Case No. 2379, we
think the file has considerable significance to the determination of this appeal. The pleadings of the parties and
the findings, conclusions and decision rendered thereon
in that case supply a historical background to the case
now before this court which definitely and materially
aided the trial Judge, Hon. John l\L Hendricks, in the
determination of the issues presented in Case No. 3708
from which this appeal is taken. In the first case the
action was brought by appellant in April1938 about twoand-a-half years after the contract was made. The trial
court found the defendants (the buyers) to be in violation
of the strict terms of this contract for failure to pay the
installments of interest and principal as specified, but
also found the seller in default for not diligently acting
to determine and remove the liens as provided by the
contract. In that decision from which the seller took
no appeal the court pointed the way for the seller to bring
the contract into good standing and obligate the buyer
to make the principal payments as specified. The court
declared the contract required the seller to bring a
suit or suits to determine the amount of and remove the
liens of the drainage bonds within a reasonable time.
The trial Judge declared a reasonable period for the
4
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completion of such action or actions to be six months
from the date of the contract. Notwithstanding this decision the record shows proceedings to determine the liens
and the extents thereof were not effectuated in the lower
court until almost fiYe years thereafter and then another
four years elapsed before the matter was finally determined hy this conrt.
Consequently, we contend that Exhibit "2" aforesaid, to wit: File X o. 2379, should be examined closely
and ghTen the consideration accorded same by the honorable Trial Judge who took up the story of the case from
where the former trial Judge left the parties. We belie';e the findings and conclusions of the trial court in the
case at bar are amply supported by the evidence and the
judgment rendered thereon the correct solution of
the case.
AUTHORITIES
Let us first address ourselves to the authorities presented by the Appellant-We have examined Foxley vs.
Rich, 35 rt. 162, 99 Pac. 666, which as far as we are able
to ascertain has Yery little, if any, application to the
ease at bar. Without briefing the case, we are content
to agree with Appellant that in a case of the type presented, we may feel constrained, without committing-ourselves, that under the facts presented in that case, the
Vendor's conduct in conveying the property to a third
party did not relieve the Vendee of making his payments
as specified in his contract. The fact remains that the
ease is not applicable to this case. In parting, the litigants
5
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here did not stipulate what the result of a breach would
be, hence, the italics of the Appellant's brief at the top
of Page 14 do not and could not possibly have any force
or· effect in the instant case.
Cases cited by Counsel in support of Foxley vs.
Rich have no more application to the case at bar than the
primary case, hence, we shall not waste effort here responding to same.
We come now to Appellant's citation, 27 R. C. 1.,
Para. 271. We respectfully submit the cited authority
has greater value to us than to the Appellant in the light
of the facts involved, for if the contract in the instant
case had been carried out as contemplated by the plain
and unequivocable terms thereof the long period between
the date of the contract and the determination of the
amountof the liens would not have happened and the
parties would have long since met their respective responsibilities under their contract.
In answer to Levine, et aL, vs. Whitehouse, et a1., 37
Utah 360, 109 Pace. 2., we say, simply, ,that the case cannot possibly apply here. The final determination of the
litigation between the Appellant and the Drainage District was absolutely necessary to apprise the Respondents of the amount they would be required to tender to the
Appellant-manifestly, a tender by the Respondents before such a determination would be an idle gesture.
Responding to Appellant's citation of Empire Investment Co., vs. Mort. (Cal.), 153 P. 236, we are at a
6
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loss to understand in what possible way that case applies
to the case at bar. There were precedent duties to be
performed by the Appellant Farnworth before the Respondents could be expected to perform their obligations
under the contract. This is particulraly true in the light
of the fact that the outstanding liens substantially exceeded the balanre owing in the contract price of the
property.
In respons'-' to Leafgreen Y. LaBar cited by Appellant on Page 17 of her brief, the Respondents are content to say that if the case was in point as to the facts, we
would still agree with the principle announced but the
facts do not square with the case here and consequenly
the announced principle is inapplicable.
Our answer to Miller vs. Jones, cited on Page 18 of
Appellant's brief is that the facts in the Case before this
Court do not lend themselves to the principle declared
therein. The possession of the Defendant has no bearing
on the point at issue. The Respondent buyers had no
means of knowing how much to tender to the seller until
the litigation involving the matter had been finally determined. Speculation as to the amount to be tendered
would have been a futile gesture of performance to avoid
the running of interest.
Finally, in answer, to authorities cited by the Appellant, ·we come to Jensen vs. Liehinstein, 45 Utah 320,
145 Pac. 1036, Page 19 of the brief. The facts of that case
are not controlling here. The contract in the case at bar
positively required the determination of the amount of
7
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outstanding liens. ThH nature of the liens required the
institution of litigation, the outcome of which was highly
speculative-Moreover, the Appellant was in possession
of the property exchanged by the Respondents under the
contract throughout the period of the litigation involving
said liens, and should not be heard to complain of Respondent's possession of the land here involved pending
the uncertainty of the litigation required to settle the
question of outstanding liens.
In support of their contention that the judgment of
the trial court should be sustained, the respondents submit the following authorities:
"If the failure to make payment of the principal debt is due to any improper act or omission of the creditor, or to such conduct on his
part as prevents the debtor from complying with
his contract to pay, interest on such debt is generally suspended during the time the debtor is so
prevented from making payment.
See Corpus Juris, Vol. 33, Page 239, Section 139, and cases cited in the footnotes.
"Where it is the creditor's duty to ascertain
the amount due to him by his debtor, interest will
not be allowed to him in advance of such ascertainment.''
See Corpus ,Juris, Vol. 33, Page 240, Section 141.
The foregoing authorities are cited for the reason
that in the instant case the appellant undertook to clear
the title to the land in question of certain liens, the amount
and extent of which were uncer, a in. Hepresentatiolls
8
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were made that such liens amonnted to the sum of
$5,000.00 and the respondents ag-reed to mortgage the
property to secure this amount and apply the proceeds
to the payment of the liens as the amounts were ascertaiiled. It later developed that the liens actually amounted to $6,800.00 and the court found that the appellant was
guilty of laches in not pursuing the necessary litigation
to determine the amount of such liens.
''In an executory contract for the sale of
land where the purchase price is payable in installments, the vendor must show that he has good
title to the land before he can recover any installment of the price.''
Graves YS.
Graves ,.s.

~Iason,
~[ason,

2 Alta. L. 179
1 Alta. L. 250

The reasons for this rule as stated in the cited authority, which is also supported by other cases found in
the footnote, 66 Corpus Juris, Page 1381, Section 1404,
are particularly applicable to the case at bar.

''It would be extremely mischievous to hold
that where the purchase money is to be paid by
installments, and when it is paid the estate is to
be conveyed, the purchaser could be eompelled to
pay all his purchase money without having a good
title she,,·n, and without the estate being discharged from incumbrances. The result would be in
nine cases out of ten that when the purchase
money had been all paid and spent, the vendor
would be unable to shew a good title or discharge
the incumbrances and the purchaser would be in
an unfortunate condition."
Gamble vs. Gumerson, 9 Grant Ch. ( Ont.)
193,200
9
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See also, Thompson, vs. Brunskill, 7 Grant Ch. ( Ont.)
542, 547, where in a case such as the one before us the
court reasoned as follows ;
"It appears to me that upon such a contract
a purchaser is not bound to pay one shilling of the
purchase money, or interest, unless a good title is
shewn; and that he stands upon the same footing
in that respect as if the whole purchase money
were payable in hand. To hold otherwise would
indeed work great wrong in many cases. In most
contracts for the sale of land, when time is given
for payment, the purchase money is made payable
by instalments. To hold that the purchaser is
bound to go on year after year, making his payment, perhaps a title of the whole before he can
demand that a good title be shown, would be a
practical negation of his ordinary equity to have
a good title shown, before he parts with his purchase money; and to leave him to his personal
remedy against the vendor would often be a
remedy only in name.''
In 27 R. C. L., Page 537, under Section 271, the
following rule appears :
"Unless it is otherwise stipulated in the contract, the unpaid purchase money does not draw
interest before the stipulated time for its payment
though the purchaser is given possession.''
Lofland vs. Maull, 1 Del. Ch. 359 12 Am.
Dec. 106;
Bouthemy vs. Ducournau, 6 :Mart, 0. S.
(La.) 657, 12 Am. Dec. 486
True, the contract in the instant case provided for
interest on deferred installments of principal, but it
must be noted that these installments of principal were
to be applied toward the liquidation of outstanding liens.
10
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When the respondents learned that the appellant was
making no efferot to determine the amount of the liens
against the propt>rty and had fnilc·d to apply monPy paid
in discharge of liens as per contract tlH•y determinPd to
suspend payments until the appellant showed some effort
to determine the amount of the outstanding liens. Manifestly, had the appellant commenced suit -within a reasonable time after the execution of the contract to determine
the amount of the liens, there ·would have been no excuse
for the respondents to suspend the payment of purchase
money as specified in the contract. But, upon the reasoning of the case above cited equity would not compel the
purchaser to go on year after year paying the $500.00 annual installment with interest while the appellant was
sitting idly by making no effort to reduce the amount
of outstainding liens to a certainty. Moreover, as shown
hereinabove, respondents learned that the amount of the
lif~ns substantially exceeded the $5,000.00 agreed upon in
the contract.
In 30 American Juris prudence, at Page 42, Section
!")2, appears the following rule:
"Where a debtor is really and bona fide ready
to make payment and intends to do so, but is prevented from doing so by the act or omission of his
creditor, the latter will not be entitled to interest.
A tender by the debtor of theamount of his debt,
if made in the proper manner, will suspend the
running of interest on the debt from the time of
snrh tender.''
Hart vs. Brand, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.)
159 10 Am. Dec. 715
See also Shannon vs. Freeman, 117 SC 480
109 SE 406
11
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There is nothing in the record to show that the
respondents were not bona fide ready to make the payments provided in the contract and had the appellant not
negligently allowed the time to run respondents would
have had no complaint about the interest payments provided. Respondents were not in a position to make a
tender because of the uncertainty of the amount neees-.
sary. However, when the amount of the liens had been
determined by the final decision of the Supreme Court,
respondents then made their tender, except interest on
deferred installments between 1936 and 1948. The tender
as made is still available to the appellant and in the
custody of the clerk of the court in Davis County.
Failure or Refusal of Vend or to Cure Defect.
55 Am. Jurisprudence, Page 720, Sec. 275.
"If the title of the vendor is defective and he
makes no effort to cure the defect in his title, but,
on the contrary, relies upon adverse possession,
he cannot subsequently successfully claim he was
not given a reasonable time in which to comply
with his contract. Moreover, when the vendor
wrongfully demands that the vendee accept a title
which is not good, and brings an action to enforee
forfeiture for the failure of the vendee to accept
the title, any right which the vendor may have
had, under other circumstances to an additional
time in which to perfect defects in his title is
lost.'' Anno. A. L. R. 1520.
Sorensen vs. Larue (1926) 43 Idaho 292, 252 Pac. 494.
In this case the vendor sought to effect a forfeiture
o fthe contract ,although he had failed to present good
title as called for by his contract. 'rhe court denied the
12
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relief but likewise denied the Yendee l'l'seission of the contract on his cross-complaint. On appeal the Supreme
Court reversed the trial court denying rescission to the
vendee, and ruling that the vendor by his wrongful eonduct in bringing the suit to forfeit \\'hen his title was not
good foreclosed his right to any additional time to perfect his title.
This principle seems to be in aeeord with good conscience, equity and justice. As applied to the case at
bar, the vendees vYould have been wholly justified in rescinding their contract when the vendor brought the
action in June, 1938, to forfeit the contract. They then
chose to make a tender of the $500.00 installment which
had not been paid and asked the court to require the
vendor to apply the money against outstanding liens. The
court denied the vendor's prayer for forfeiture and
ordered the deed to the land restored to the clerk of the
court to await further action of the vendor in curing the
defects in the title.
The vendor cries injustice and inequity because the
trial court in the present action denied interest while she
took ten years to clear defects of which she had full knowledge at the time she made her contract. Injustice certaily would have been done the vendes had the court required vendees to pay interest during the years the
vendor took her own sweet time to clear the liens. Then,
too, we must not overlook the fact that the bulk of the
purchase price had already been paid in the exchange of
properties.

13
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We respectfully submit the judgment of the lower
court should be affirmed and costs herein awarded to
respondents.

E. LEROY SHIELDS,
GROVER A. GILES
Attorneys for Defenda;nts
a;nd Respondents.
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